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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD D. MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife, BOYD A. 
SWENSEN and BEATRICE SWENSEN, 
his wife, BLAINE ANDERSON and 
SHEREE ANDERSON, his wife, 
HOPE A. HILTON, CYNTHIA 
HILTON, RALPH M HILTON, 
GENE HELLAND and the MIDDLE 
EAST FOUNDATION, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT 
BRIMHALL, and JOHN DOES I to 
V, being former Commissioners 
of the Utah Department of 
Financial Institutions, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 19704 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
MATURE QF THE CASE 
This is an action by several investors in Grove 
Finance Company against former Comissioners of the Utah 
Department of Financial Institutions, to recover the full 
amount of their investment which was lost when Grove Finance 
became insolvent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, Honorable David B. Dee, 
granted Respondents1 motion for summary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT PN APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the order granting 
summary judgment and remand to the district court. 
STATEMENT PF FACTS 
Respondents generally agree with the Statement of 
Facts in Appellants1 Brief, other than disagreeing to some 
extent as to the basis of the Court's ruling in Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah, 1983) (discussed in Point 
II, infill In addition, however, Respondents would point 
out that, to this day, Appellants have filed no notice of 
claim in this matter, pursuant to Sections 63-30-11 and -12 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (R.64); and that 
Appellants filed the same complaint in this matter as was 
filed in the earlier Maflsen Vt BQEthJcK, g.upra (here-
inafter "Madsen I"), except that in this action they have 
(1) named Commissioners Borthick and Brimhall instead of 
Commissioner Borthick and the State as defendants (see 
paragraph 2 in each Complaint); (2) claimed that the 
identical acts now constitute "gross negligence" (see 
paragraph 5 in each Complaint); (3) dropped their class 
action allegations; and (4) alleged that a duty to supervise 
Grove Finance Company existed under both Title 7 (as 
previously alleged) and Title 70B of the Utah Code (see 
Appellants1 "Alternative Cause of Action" in Complaint in 
-2-
instant action). The Complaint from Madsen I (supplement 
to record herein) is appended hereto as Appendix A, and the 
Complaint from this action (R.2-8) as Appendix B. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. RESPONDENTS ARE IMMUNE FROM 
SUIT IN THIS ACTION ON PRECISELY THE 
SAME GROUNDS SET OUT IN MADSEN V, 
BORTHICK, BECAUSE THIS SUIT IS IN 
SUBSTANCE THE SAME SUIT AND COMES TO THE 
COURT IN THE SAME POSTURE AS THE EARLIER 
ACTION. 
in Maflgen Vt BorthicKr &HSL&, 658 P.2d 627 
(Utah, 1983), this Court held that: 
(1) Governmental supervision of financial 
institutions is a "governmental function" to which 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (U.C.A. 
63-30-1, et seq.) apply; 
(2) Since Appellants did not comply with U.C.A. 
63-30-11 and -12, the notice requirement of the Immunity 
Act, their Complaint against the State was properly 
dismissed; 
(3) Under U.C.A. 63-30-4, a "governmental 
official or employee can only be sued in a representative 
capacity when the governmental entity is liable," JUL. at 
633, so dismissal as to Commissioner Borthick in his 
representative capacity was proper; and 
(4) Dismissal as to Commissioner Borthick in his 
individual capacity was also proper because, under U.C.A. 
-3-
63-30-4, no allegation was made in the Complaint of "gross 
negligence, fraud, or malice." 
The instant case comes to the Court in precisely 
the same posture as Madsen I, with no notice of claim ever 
having been filed (R. 64). Appellants employ several 
ingenious semantic dodges in their present Complaint in 
order to circumvent the Court1s ruling in Madsen I. but 
as a matter of law, still fail to state a valid claim. 
A. THIS ACTION AGAINST STATE EMPLOYEES 
IS BARRED BY U.C.A. 63-30-4, SINCE THE 
SAME ACTION AGAINST THE STATE HAS 
PREVIOUSLY FAILED. 
U.C.A. 63-30-4(3), as amended by the 1983 Utah 
Legislature, states: 
The remedy against a governmental 
entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which 
occurs during the performance of such 
employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority 
is. . . . exclusive cf any ,Qther civil 
action <?r. p.KQce.e.<3iog fry reason, .of the 
same subject matter against the employee 
. . . whose act or omission gave rise to 
the claim, unless the employee cited or 
failed to act through fraud or malice. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The 1983 Legislature deleted the words "gross negligence" 
prior to "fraud or malice" in the final clause. 
In Madsen I. Appellants sued the State of Utah 
to recover the amount of their investment in Grove Finance 
Company. That action failed. Appellants may not now 
maintain this action against Commissioners Borthick and 
-4-
Brimhall, because their "remedy" against the State was 
"exclusive of any other civil action" against state 
employees. Both the clear statutory language and common 
sense dictate that a separatef substantively identical cause 
of action may not be brought against public employees where 
it has been previously held that no cause of action exists 
against the public entity which employed them. 
Appellants seek to circumvent this provision by 
alleging that Respondents are named in their individual 
rather than representative capacity, that the pre-1983 
statutory language applies here, and that their claim of 
"gross negligence" makes this case a valid exception to the 
statutory rule. These points are not well-taken. 
B. RESPONDENTS IN THIS ACTION ARE CLEARLY 
NAMED IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY AND, 
SINCE APPELLANTS HAVE NEVER FILED A 
NOTICE OF CLAIM, THIS ACTION MUST BE 
DISMISSED UNDER THE COURT'S HOLDING IN 
MAPSEN I. 
In Madsen I, this Court relied on the pre-1983 
versions of U.C.A. 63-30-11 and -12, the notice-of-claim 
statutes: 
63-30-11. Any person having a claim for 
injury to person or property against a 
governmental entity or its employee 
ghallr before maintaining an action 
untier this act, .file a written notice of 
£ialm with such entity for appropriate 
relief including money damages. The 
notice of claim shall . . . be directed 
and delivered to the responsible 
governmental entity within the time 
prescribed in section 63-30-12 or 
-5-
63-30-13, as applicable. 
• • • 
63-30-12. A .claim against,-the state is 
fr.arrefl unless.notice of Plaint is filefl 
with the attorney general and the agency 
concerned within one .year after the 
cause of action arises. (Emphasis by 
Court, 658 P.2d at 630). 
The Court ruled that dismissal of Madsen I as to the State 
was proper "on the basis of governmental immunity and 
noncompliance with the notice requirement." JLsL. at 632. 
As to Commissioner Borthick, the Court cited the 
final paragraph of U.C.A. 63-30-4: 
An employee may be joined in an action 
against a governmental entity in a 
representative capacity if the act or 
omission complained of is one for which 
the governmental entity may be liable, 
but no employee shall be. .helfl 
personally liable for acts .or omissions 
.occurring fluting .the performance of .the 
employee's duties > « t, unless .it, is 
established that the, .employee acted .or 
failed to act flue to gross .negligencei 
fraufl or malice, (Emphasis by Court, 
658 P.2d at 633.) 
(Again, the 1983 Legislature removed the words "gross 
negligence" in the final clause.) 
In the instant action, Commissioners Borthick and 
Brimhall are clearly named in a representative capacity, as 
former Commissioners of Financial Institutions for the State 
of Utah. Appellants1 startling assertion that "It]he 
respondents in this action are individuals being sued in 
their individual capacity only" (Appellants1 Brief, p. 8) is 
thoroughly belied by the Complaint. The action names 
-6-
Commissioner Borthick and Brimhall and John Does I to V, 
"being former Commissioners of the Utah Department of 
Financial Institutions11 (R.2). Paragraph 2 of the Complaint 
identifies the John Does as former commissioners, and 
states: 
This allegation includes each 
commissioner who has held office from 
the incorporation of Grove Finance to 
the insolvency of Grove Finance* 
(R.2-3). 
Furthermore, the entire tenor of the Complaint is 
that Respondents purportedly failed to fulfill a statutory 
duty to inspect and regulate the financial affairs of Grove 
Finance (cf. paragraphs 4 and 12-14 at R. 3-5, 6). Of 
course, the idea that Respondents had any such duty or 
authority in a personal capacity is ludicrous, and the 
Complaint makes no such pretense. It was also undisputed 
on the record before the District Court in this matter that 
neither Respondent ever had any dealings or involvement of 
any kind with Grove Finance in any private capacity, and 
that any activity in which either Respondent ever engaged 
relating to the inspection or supervision of financial 
institutions occurred within the scope of his employment as 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions (R.53, 55). 
This Court has previously stated: 
The substance of the pleading and the 
nature of the issues which are raised, 
rather than the pleader's designation of 
the cause of action, control the issue. 
-7-
LQffl Vt ShflWr 665 P.2d 1288, 1290 
(Utah, 1983). 
In this case, only Respondents1 official activities as State 
officers are advanced as a basis for liability; Respondents 
are clearly named in a i.epteisentetive capacity, and 
Appellants1 semantic wand-waving does not make it otherwise. 
Since the State is not liable in this matter, as 
the Court held in Madsen I, State officials named in their 
representative capacity for official acts or omissions 
cannot be sued, 658 P.2d at 633. Precisely the same grounds 
on which the Court relied in the earlier case mandate the 
affirming of the District Court's action in this case. 
C. THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT ARE REMEDIAL IN NATURE AND 
APPLY TO BAR THIS ACTION, EVEN IF IT IS 
ASSUMED ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENTS ARE 
NAMED IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY. 
Next, Appellants argue that an allegation of 
fgross negligence" in their Complaint is sufficient, under 
the pre-1983 statutes, to obviate the notice-of-claim 
requirement of U.C.A. 63-30-11 and -12 and to circumvent the 
language of U.C.A. 63-30-4 barring personal liability 
(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 8-10, 12-14). As to the claim 
statute, Appellants rely on what was the second paragraph of 
U.C.A. 63-30-11, prior to 1983: 
Service of the notice of claim upon an 
employee of a governmental entity is not 
a condition precedent to the 
commencement of an action or special 
proceeding against such person. If an 
-8-
action or special proceeding is 
commenced against the employee, but not 
against the governmental entity, service 
of the notice of claim upon the 
governmental entity is required only if 
the entity has a statutory duty to 
indemnify such person. 
Appellants argue that there is no obligation to indemnify an 
employee if it is established that he acted with gross 
negligence, under U.C.A. 63-48-3(4) as that section existed 
prior to 1983, and that therefore no notice of claim was 
required in this case (Appellants1 Brief, p. 10). 
The 1983 Legislature made the following changes 
which pertain to this action: 
1. Deleted the phrase "gross .negligence".from 
U.C.A, 63-30-4, clarifying the broad applicability of the 
exclusive remedy rule and the fairly narrow grounds on which 
public employees may be personally liable; 
2. Amended U>CtA« 63-3Q-U to clarify the fact 
that a notice of claim must be served upon the State if, as 
here, a claim is asserted against a State employee for an 
act or omission occurring during the performance of his 
duties (compare 1983 and pre-1983 versions in Appendix C 
herein); 
3. Repealed in toto the former second paragraph 
ftf.UtCtAt 63-3Q-Ilr set out £U£L&, the section of the 
notice requirement upon which Appellants rely; and 
4. Recodified U,C,At 63-48-3 .as.U.,.CtA, 63-3Q-36i 
-9-
an<3 in so flpingr. repealed .UnCtAt 63-48-3(4?* upon which 
Appellants rely for their contention that the State has no 
duty to indemnify Respondents. 
Respondents submit that each of these changes is 
remedial in naturer not creating or repealing substantive 
rights, but setting forth with greater clarity the notice 
procedure which must be followed in bringing suit against 
public entities or employees within the scope of employment, 
and the bounds of potential liability in such cases as 
between entities and their employees. The same substantive 
causes of action that existed prior to the amendments still 
exist, against either the entity or the employee; 
modifications in the notice requirement or the duty of 
public entities to indemnify employees do not affect these 
substantive rights. 
Remedial statutory amendments, providing only wa 
different mode or form of procedure for enforcing 
substantive right . . . are generally applied 
retrospectively to accrued or pending actions to further the 
Legislature's remedial purpose." Pilghet y, St3t6r 
Department Qf social Servige&r 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah, 
1983). Foil v. Ballinoer, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1979), a 
case upon which Appellants rely, which considered the 
limitation and notice-of-claim provisions of the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, stands for the proposition that 
-10-
remedial amendments which clarify existing procedural 
requirements for the bringing of particular actions, apply 
"to accrued, pending, and future actions." ±&. at 151, 
citing Boijgpfski y, JfrCQfrsep, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 
(1909). 
This action was filed on July 20, 1983 
(Appellants' Brief, pp. 2, 4), well after the 1983 
amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act were in effect. 
The amendments are remedial in nature, and clearly bar the 
instant action. 
D. EVEN IF IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE 1983 
AMENDMENTS DO NOT APPLY HERE, 
APPELLANTS' MERE UNSUPPORTED ALLEGATION 
OF "GROSS NEGLIGENCE" IS NOT SUFFICIENT 
TO OBVIATE THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT AND 
OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT. 
Finally, giving the benefit of every doubt to 
Appellants and assuming arguendo that Respondents are not 
named in a representative capacity ami that the 1983 
amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act do not apply 
here, a careful review of the pre-1983 law compels the 
conclusion that Appellants have still failed to state a 
valid cause of action. 
Appellants1 allegation in this action of "gross 
negligence" is made in order to circumvent (1) the notice-
of-claim requirement in U.C.A. 63-30-11 and (2) the 
exclusive-remedy and no-personal-liability provisions of 
-11-
U.C.A. 63-30-4• Before examining each of those sections, it 
is important to emphasize the lack of support in Appellants' 
Complaint for their gratuitous allegation of "gross 
negligence," and the identical substance of this Complaint 
and the Complaint in Madsen I, where no "gross negligence" 
was alleged. In paragraph 4 of the earlier Complaint, 
Appellants listed nine statutory duties they claim 
Respondents had under Title 7, and stated in paragraph 5: 
Defendants have wholly failed to 
discharge the duties and 
responsibilities pleaded in # 4 above. 
(R. supp.) 
In the instant Complaint, the identical list of duties is 
set out verbatim in paragraph 4, and paragraph 5 then 
states: 
Defendants have been grossly negligent 
in that they have wholly failed to 
discharge any of the duties and 
responsibilities pleaded in # 4 above. 
(R.5). 
Mo additional facts are set forth as a basis for the new 
allegation of "gross negligence." 
So pleading is a transparent attempt by Appellants 
to circumvent requirements of the Immunity Act and the 
ruling in Madsen I by simply repeating the legal 
catchword, "gross negligence." This attempt to exalt form 
over substance should not be abetted by the Court. The 
"substance of the pleading and the nature of the issues 
• . . raised" must control, rather than "the pleader's 
-12-
designation" of his action. Lord v. Shaw, supra, 665 
P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah, 1983). As this Court observed in 
Madsen I, "An important legal consequence should not be at 
the mercy of semantics." 658 P.2d at 631. 
(1) UtCtAt 63-3Q-11-
In order to skirt the claim requirement, 
Appellants rely on the since-repealed second paragraph of 
U.C.A. 63-30-11, providing that, if an action is commenced 
against an employee but not against a governmental entity, 
"service of the notice of claim upon the governmental entity 
is required only if the entity has a statutory duty to 
indemnify" the employee. In support of their allegation 
that the State would not have a duty to indemnify 
Commissioners Borthick and Brimhall, Appellants rely on 
U.C.A. 63-48-3(4) (also repealed in 1983): 
No public entity is obligated to pay any 
judgment based upon a claim against an 
officer or employee if it is 
.established that the officer or 
employee acted or failed to act due to 
gross negligence, fraud, or malice. 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is significant that, in order to nullify the 
indemnification duty, gross negligence, fraud, or malice 
must be established, presumably at a trial on the merits, 
not merely alleged in a plaintiff's complaint. By the 
indemnification provisions, the Legislature intended "to 
protect officers and employees of public entities from 
-13-
personal liability arising from acts or omissions committed 
. • . within the scope of their employment. . . ." (former 
U.C.A. 63-48-1)• It is inconceivable that the Legislature 
intended such protection to be so ephemeral as to vanish at 
the mere unsupported mention of "gross negligence" in a 
plaintiff's complaint. 
The Statefs duty to indemnify its employees is to 
some extent linked to its representation of the employee, as 
set forth in U.C.A. 63-48-3(2): 
If the public entity conducts the 
defense of the officer or employee 
against the claim* then the public 
entity shall pay any judgment based upon 
or any compromise or settlement of the 
claim except as provided in 
subsections (3) or (4). . . . (Emphasis 
added.) 
In turn, if a public officer desires defense against "any 
claim," he must request that the entity defend him and must 
cooperate in the defense; unless he fails to do so, the 
entity is obligated to defend him "against the claim*" 
U.C.A. 63-48-3(1), and to "pay any judgment based upon . . . 
the £laim . . . . " , U.C.A. 63-48-3(2) (emphasis added). 
The important term, "claim," was statutorily defined as: 
• • . any alleged personal legal 
liability arising out of any act or 
omission by any officer or employee 
during the performance of his, duties 
within the scope of hi*? employmentt or 
unc?er color of authority* U.C.A. 
63-48-2(3) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the focus of the pre-1983 indemnification provisions 
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was on whether the employee's conduct occurred within the 
scope of employment: if so, the alleged liability 
constituted a "claim," and the entity had a duty to defend 
the employee (assuming a request and cooperation by the 
employee), and to pay any judgment based on the claim. The 
question of whether "gross negligence" was involved had no 
bearing upon the initial obligation to defend and 
subsequently to indemnify the employee, unless the existence 
of gross negligence was established by the finder of fact, 
under U.C.A. 63-48-3(4). 
As a matter of statutory construction, therefore, 
the question of whether the State had a statutory duty to 
indemnify Respondents, so as to require a notice of claim 
under the former second paragraph of U.C.A. 63-30-11, 
depends upon whether the conduct alleged was within the 
scope of Respondents1 public employment, not whether 
Appellants make an allegation of "gross negligence." This 
construction also makes eminently good common sense. 
Whether an act or omission involved "gross negligence" is a 
classic fact question which, in any disputed case, must be 
resolved by the trier of fact. No doubt recognition of 
this fact, and a desire that an entity1s duty to indemnify 
its employee not be avoided whenever a mere allegation of 
gross negligence is made, led to the requirement in U.C.A. 
63-48-3(4) that gross negligence be established in order 
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for an entity to avoid its indemnification duty. It would 
make no sense at all for the notice-of-claim requirement to 
depend on a determination of this purely factual question as 
the initial step of litigation, prior to the filing of a 
lawsuit or to opportunity by the parties to discover fully 
the facts of the case. 
A far more sensible course is to construe the 
former second paragraph of U.C.A. 63-30-11 to require filing 
a claim where the conduct alleged occurred "during the 
performance of [the employee's] duties, within the scope of 
his employment, or under color of authority," so as to 
constitute a "claim" for which a public entity must provide 
indemnification. It is certainly true that some factual 
determination is involved in deciding whether conduct was 
during the performance of public duties, within the scope of 
public employment, or under color of authority. However, as 
a practical matter, Respondents submit that in the vast 
majority of cases, this determination can be far more 
readily made at the initial stage of proceedings, when a 
notice of claim must be filed, than can a largely subjective 
determination as to whether an employee acted with "gross 
negligence, fraud, or malice." 
This interpretation is substantiated by the 
clarifying amendment of U.C.A. 63-30-11 which the 1983 
Legislature made (now codified as 63-30-11(2)): 
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Any person having a claim for injury 
against a governmental entity or against 
an employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his 
duties, within the scope of employment, 
or under color of authority shall, 
before maintaining an action, file a 
written notice of claim with such 
entity. 
As discussed in Point I-Bf supra. the 
allegations in Appellants1 Complaint undeniably center on 
acts or omissions occurring within the scope of Respondents1 
employment as Commissioners of Financial Institutions and 
during the performance of their official duties. The State 
has a palpably clear obligation to indemnify Respondents for 
any judgment Appellants may eke out in this matter. That 
this is so was obvious from the time of the closure of Grove 
Finance Company onward. Appellants cannot void the 
statutory notice requirement by a gratuitous allegation of 
"gross negligence." 
(2) UtCA, 63-3Q-4-
Prior to 1983, the second paragraph of U.C.A. 
63-30-4 provided that a remedy against a governmental entity 
or employee was exclusive of any other action against an 
employee, unless the employee acted with gross negligence, 
fraud, or malice. The third paragraph stated that no 
employee may be held personally liable for acts "during the 
performance of the employeefs duties, within the scope of 
employment or under color of authority," unless gross 
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negligence, fraud, or malice were established. Again, the 
clear contemplation seems to be that gross negligence, 
fraud, or malice must have been established by the trier of 
fact in the initial action against the entity or employee, 
before a plaintiff may proceed with a separate additional 
suit against the employee. In any event, there is no 
indication that the statutory standard of no liability for 
public employees within the scope of employment was intended 
to be obviated by a mere allegation of gross negligence, as 
Appellants contend. As set out supra. important legal 
consequences should not depend upon the mere recitation of a 
legal catch-phrase in a complaint. 
Under U.C.A. 63-30-4, Appellants1 earlier action 
against the State and a State official was their exclusive 
remedy; they may not now have a second bite at the apple by 
suing the same official and his predecessor for the same 
damages claimed previously. 
POINT II: APPELLANTS1 ACTION WAS 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE IN MADSEN I 
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, AND IS NOW 
BARRED BY RES JUDICATA. 
In order for the doctrine of res judicata to apply 
so as to bar a second action: 
(1) the two cases must be between the 
same parties or their privies; (2) there 
must have been a final judgment on the 
merits of the prior case; and (3) the 
prior adjudication must have involved 
the same issue or an issue that could or 
should have been raised therein. 
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Krofcheck v. Downev State Bank. 580 
P.2d 243, 244 (Utah, 1978). 
The doctrine applies with equal force to issues actually 
adjudicated and to issues or claims which could have been 
adjudicated in the earlier proceedings. Church v. Meadow 
Spring Rangh Corporationf lnc»# 659 p.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah, 
1983); searle Brost v. Searle, 588 p.2d 689, 690 (Utah, 
1978). 
Apparently Appellants do not dispute that the 
first and third Krofcheck criteria are met in this case. 
As to (1), Commissioner Borthick was a named defendant in 
the earlier case, and clearly a state official such as 
Commissioner Brimhall is in privity with the State, which 
was also a defendant in Madsen I (see 50 C.J.S., Judgments 
796a, p. 335); the plaintiffs in the two cases are the same. 
As to (3) precisely the same nucleus of operative fact is 
alleged here as in Madsen I: in both cases, Appellants 
seek to recover the full amount of their investment in Grove 
Finance Company, plus interest, on the basis that officials 
of the Department of Financial Institutions failed to 
properly supervise or regulate the financial affairs of 
Grove. Appellants1 new allegations regarding gross 
negligence and a duty to supervise under Title 70B are 
merely statements of additional JLsaal grounds on which 
Appellants hope to recover, based upon the same facts as in 
Madsen I, These additional legal issues could certainly 
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have been raised in the earlier suit, were they viable; the 
fact that Appellants chose not to do so does not defeat 
application of res judicata. 
Appellants do contend, however, that the earlier 
dismissal of their action was not on the merits, being based 
upon their failure to file a notice of claim, and so res 
judicata does not apply (Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-8). This 
misconstrues the basis of the Court's decision in the 
earlier suit. 
In Madsen I, this Court affirmed dismissal of 
Appellants1 action against the State because no notice of 
claim had been filed, and on the additional ground of 
substantive immunity. After concluding that the case 
involved a "governmental function" to which the Immunity Act 
applies, the Court continued: 
Since the injury allegedly 
suffered by plaintiffs resulted from 
"the exercise of a governmental 
function," the state is immune from suit 
under § 63-30-3, unless immunity is 
expressly waived in one of the 
succeeding sections of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. Section 63-30-10 waives 
immunity for injuries caused by the 
negligent act or omission of a 
government employee (except those 
arising out of "a discretionary 
function"). While plaintiffs1 
allegation that defendnt Borthick had 
"wholly failed to discharge" his 
statutory duties and responsibilities 
might be construed as an allegation of a 
negligent omission, plaintiffs expressly 
disavowed that construction by 
conceding in the flig.trict c<?nrt that 
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their cause of action did not fall under 
any of the statutory exceptions to 
immunity. They make no contrary 
argument in this Court. For this 
reasonf and because their cause of 
action is barred in any case by the 
notice of claim provision. . . we have 
no occasion to rule upon whether 
defendant Borthick's action constituted 
"a negligent act or omission of an 
employee" or involved a "discretionary 
function" within the meaning of § 
63-30-10. . . . 
The dismissal of plaintiffs' 
complaint against the State was proper 
p.n. the .basis. of. .governmental. immunity 
and noncompliance with the notice 
requirement. 658 P.2d at 631-2 
(emphasis added). 
It is not contended by Appellants, nor could it 
validly be, that dismissal of an action on grounds of 
substantive immunity is not an adjudication on the merits to 
which res judicata would apply. Cf. Annapolis Urban 
Renewal Authority v>..lnterJLinkf lnc«r 43 Md.App. 286, 405 
A.2d 313 (1979), where the court held that a prior judgment 
on the basis of sovereign immunity was a "judgment on the 
merits" for res judicata purposes: 
When a court dismisses an action because 
of jurisdictional, procedural, or venue 
problems, it is acting for reasons that 
do not go to the substance of the case. 
But, when a court decides that it 
g.annct hear the case because of .a legal 
defense such as sovereign immtfnityf.it 
is deciding thatr as a,substantive 
matterr the plaintiff cannot maintain 
his cause of action* 
• • • 
[W]e believe that . . . a judgment based 
upon the defense [of sovereign immunity] 
is a judgment on the merits. id. at 
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318, 319 (emphasis added; see discussion 
at 317-19)• 
The Maryland court approvingly cited Bell v. Hood, 327 
U.S. 678f 66 S.Ct. 773, 776 (1946): 
Il]t is well settled that the failure to 
state a proper cause of action calls for 
a judgment on the merits and not for a 
dismissal for want of jurisdiction. . . 
If the court does . . • exercise its 
jurisdiction to determine that the 
allegations in the complaint do not 
state a ground for relief, then 
dismissal of the case would be on the 
merits. . • . Cited 405 A.2d at 318. 
It is worthy of note that the district court's 
dismissal in Madsen I was with prejudice, "for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted." JL&. at 
628. This distinguishes the instant case from Foil v. 
Ballinaer, supra, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1979), relied upon 
by Appellants for the proposition that dismissal for failure 
to comply with a notice-of-claim requirement (there, the 
provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act) does not 
constitute an adjudication on the merits. Appellants1 
reliance ignores the status of the earlier dismissal in the 
Foil case: 
Because the [earlier] suit was 
dismissed, without prejudice/ the 
dismissal was not an adjudication on the 
merits. 1&. at 149 (emphasis added). 
It is also noteworthy that, in paragraph 9 of 
their Complaint, Appellants allege that they discovered 
their loss on July 18, 1980, when Grove Finance closed its 
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doors (R.5); and that Madsen I was dismissed by the 
district court on May 14, 1981 (Appellants1 Brief, p. 3), 
less than one year later. Had the district court's 
dismissal been solely based on a failure to file notice, the 
appropriate course would have been a dismissal without 
prejudice, since Appellants at that time were still within 
the one-year notice period (U.C.A. 63-30-12), and could 
still have filed a notice of claim. That the district 
court's action was also based on substantive immunity is 
evident in its dismissal for failure to state a claim. 
Moreover, even if substantive immunity were not 
involved here, strong policy reasons favor considering 
dismissal for failure to file timely notice a res judicata 
bar to subsequent suits. An analagous situation was 
presented in Haefner Vt .CQtfnty Of, .Lancaster* 543 F.Supp. 
264 (E.D. Pa., 1982), &££&. # 703 F.2d 550 (3d Cir., 1983). 
Plaintiff Haefner brought a 1983 action against a city, 
county, and public officials, alleging a conspiracy to 
secure a criminal prosecution against him. The federal 
court dismissed Haefnerfs first suit because it was time-
barred under the applicable Pennsylvania statute of 
limitation, aaefner Vt..CQwnty of Lancaster * 520 F.supp. 
131 (E.D. Pa., 1981), a££&-# 681 F.2d 806 (3d Cir., 1982). 
Haefner then brought a second suit, naming one additional 
individual defendant not named in the first suit, and adding 
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allegations concerning additional false charges and failure 
to expunge his record, 543 F.Supp. at 266. Finding first 
that the same parties were involved in both cases, the court 
continued: 
We have equally little trouble finding 
that the second required element, a 
final, valid judgment on the merits, is 
met. A .dismissal for .failure, to, .state 
a claim is a "judgment on .the, merits." 
[citation omitted] Likewise, dismissal 
9f a suit, as.time-barred establishes a 
res judicata bai* [citation omitted] 
JL&. (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, in the instant matter, dismissal of Appellants1 
suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted must be deemed a final judgment on the merits, 
supporting application of res judicata. 
The sound policy bases for applying the previous 
judgment under res judicata to this case are evident. If 
the instant action were allowed, any plaintiff, having 
suffered an adverse ruling in an action against a state 
agency, could bring another action based on the same facts 
against any agency employee involved with the alleged loss. 
Presumably the number of successive suits which could be 
brought on that basis would be limited only by the 
plaintiff's tenacity and the number of separate employees 
who could be linked in any way to a purported loss. All of 
the elements of res judicata are present here, and the 
district court1s ruling in this case should be affirmed. 
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POINT III: THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY THE 
THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONf U.C.A. 
78-12-26(4), AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
ORDER SHOULD ALSO BE AFFIRMED ON THIS 
BASIS. 
As previously noted, in paragraph 9 of their 
Complaint Appellants aver that they did not discover 
Respondents1 alleged negligence until July 18, 1980, when 
Grove Finance was taken into receivership by the State 
(R.5). Complaint in the instant matter was filed on July 
20, 1983 (Appellants1 Brief/ pp. 2, 4). This would appear 
to be three years and two days after the latest date when a 
cause of action may be deemed to have arisen. 
In Madsen I, 658 P.2d at 631, n. 7, this Court 
indicated in dicta that the statute of limitation which 
would apply in this case is U.C.A. 78-12-26(4), which 
provides a three-year limitation on an action "for a 
liability created by the statutes of this statef other than 
for a penalty or forfeiture. . . ." The instant action is 
thus barred as untimely. 
Appellants argue that U.C.A. 78-12-40 saves their 
suit (Appellants Brief, pp. 10-12). The statutory language 
itself belies that contention: 
If.any agtlpn
 uj& .cpmmengefl within flue 
time and . . . the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the 
time limited either by law or contract 
for commencing the same shall have 
expired, the plaintiff . . . may 
commence a new action within one year 
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after the reversal or failure. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the operation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 is 
contingent upon the action initially having been commenced 
in a timely and proper manner; the section does not 
operate as a cure-all for failures to comply with conditions 
precedent to filing earlier suits. Foil v. Ballinaer. 
£UE£&, indicates that Section 78-12-40 does not apply 
here; in that case, the Court found that the plaintiff could 
refile her action within one year jJL the first action had 
been properly "commenced" as that term is used in section 
78-12-40. 601 P.2d at 149 (emphasis added). Heref 
Appellants1 initial action was never properly "commenced 
within due time" (i.e., within one year of denial of an 
appropriate notice of claim, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12, 
-15), and may not now be resurrected by Section 78-12-40. 
CONCLUSION 
Commissioner Borthick and Commissioner Brimhall 
are named defendants in this action in their capacity as 
former Commissioners of Financial Institutions of the State 
of Utah for acts or omissions which occurred during the 
performance of their official duties, within the scope of 
that employment, and under color of authority. Under the 
Court's decision in the first Madsen v. Borthick, because 
the State is not subject to suit, neither are Respondents. 
Furthermore, Appellants have never filed a notice of claim 
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under U.C.A. 63-30-11, and their suit is barred under either 
the 1983 or pre-1983 version of that statute. Appellants1 
gratuitous allegations of "gross negligence" have no 
substance and do not change that result. 
In addition, both the doctrine of res judicata, in 
light of the ruling in Madsen I, and the applicable 
statute of limitation, U.C.A. 78-12-26(4), bar this action. 
Respondents pray tht the order of the district 
court granting summary judgment in their favor be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of April, 
1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
STEPHEN J.V^ORENSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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211 SHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD D. MADSEN and 
NANCY MADSEN, his wife, 
BOYD A. SWENSEN and 
BEATRICE SWENSEN, his 
Wife, EOPE A HILTON, 
BLAINE ANDERSON and 
SHEREE ANDfRSON, his 
wife, CYNTHIA HILTON, 
RALPH M. HILTON, 
MIDDLE EAST FOUNDATION 
and GENE A HELLAND, 
on behalf of themselves 
and all others aimilarly 
aituated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MIRVIN D. BORTKICK, Commissioner 
of the Utah Department, of 
Financial Institutions; and 
tha STATE OF UTAH 
Defendants. 
On behalf of themselves and all others aimilarly 
aituated, plaintiffa allege: 
PASTIES AND RELATED ENTITIES 
1. Plaintiffs are each depositors in Grove Finance 
Company. 
2. Defendant Mirvin D. Borthick ia tha Commissioner 
of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions. 
3. Grove Finance Company ia a Utah corporation 
transecting a banking business within the Stata of Utah within 
tha meaning of S 7*3-1 U.C.A. in thatGrova Finance Company 
holds itself out to the public aa receiving money on deposit 
within the meaning of $ 7-3-3 U.C.A. 
C O M P L A I N T 
Civil No. C&/-/79/? 
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE 0F ACTION 
4* Defendant Mirvin D. Borthick and the defendant 
State of Utah bad a duty to inspect and supervise the financial 
integrity of Grove Finance Company within the aeaning of 
f 7-1*7 O.C.A. In particular, defendants bad a duty to do the 
following: 
A. Visit and examine every banking business at least 
once each year within the aeaning of S 7-1-8 U.C.A. 
B. At the time of each annual vialt to inquire into 
the condition and resources of the institution examined, the 
aode of conducting and managing its affairs, the official 
actions of its directors and officers, the investment and 
disposition of its funds, the security offered to members and 
whether or not it was violating any provisions of law within 
the aeaning of S 7-1-8 U.C.A. 
C. Notify the board of directora of any banking 
business in writing if any officer or employee of that bank was 
found to be dishonest, reckless or incompetent or failed to 
perform any duty of his office within the aeaning of S 7-1-13 
U.C.A. 
D. Jtequire the board of directora of each banking 
business to examine the affairs of the institution with a 
special purpose of ascertaining the value and security thereof 
within the aeaning of S 7-1-14 U.C.A. 
2. Call for not lass than four reports each year 
concerning the condition of each banking business and to certify 
such report for publication within the aeaning of f 7-1-17 U.C.A. 
F. Call for apecial reports as aay be necessary for 
the protection of the public within the aeaning of S 7-1-18 U.C.A. 
6. Inform the county attorney of any violation of any 
provision of law which constitutes a misdemeanor or felony by any 
officer, director or employee of any banking business within the 
aeaning of f 7-1-23 U.C.A. 
8. Refuse to grant approval for the filing of articles 
of incorporation of any banking business when the plan of 
operation does not comply with the lavs of this state vithin 
the meaning of S 7*1-26 U.C.A. 
2. Take possesion of the business and property of 
any banking business vfaich is conducting its business in an 
unauthorised or unsafe manner vithin the meaning of S 7-2-1 U.C.A. 
5. Defendants have vholly failed to discharge the 
duties and responsibilities pleaded in I 4 above. 
C. Plaintiffs reasonably believed that defendants had 
discharged the duties and responsibilities pleaded in f 4 above. 
7* Plaintiffs relied upon defendants to inspect and 
supervise Grove Finance Company as pleaded in I 4 above? and in 
reliance thereon, plaintiffs have each deposited or placed 
substantial sums of money vith Grove Finance Company. 
8. Grove Finance Company has vholly failed to meet 
the requirements set up by Utah lav# viz., $ 7-3-1 et seq. U.C.A. 
As a result thereof, Grove Finance Company has become insolvent. 
9. By reason of the insolvency of Grove Finance 
Company, the named plaintiffs have lost substantial sums of 
money, the exact amount of vhich cannot be ascertained prior to 
discovery. 
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 
10. This action is brought by plaintiffs as a class 
action on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated under the provisions of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
11. The class consists of all persons, or other entities, 
vhohave deposited funds vith Grove Finance Company# a Utah 
corporation, vith its principal place of business in Utah County. 
12. The exact number of class members is not known, but 
plaintiffs allege on information end belief that there are in 
excess of one thousand members. The class is so numerous that 
joinder of individual members herein is impracticable. 
-s-
13. There art common question,
 o f law ^ fast ^ ^ 
class members; mamely, whether tha Stat*
 of „ t a h properly ,uper. 
TJ**3 MB3 Jj3jep»rt*3 'Grey* TJjgjuoPf Caapsjjy^ 
14. Th. claims of plaintiffs Vh0 are representatives 
of tha class herein ara typical of tha c*alffl, of the c l a„ ln 
that tha claias of tha named plaintiffs ^
 the clalffi8 of th9 
class member, each arise by reason of a W i n g relationship 
with Grove Finance Company. There is no
 TOnfllct „ between any 
ladividually-naaed plaintiffs and other w ^ .
 o £ thm c l „ 8 wlth 
respect to this action or with respect t<>
 tht ciais» for ralief 
herein set forth. 
15. The named plaintiffs will
 fairly u d adequately 
protect the interests of the class. 
16. This action is properly »*.intained M a class 
action for the following reasons1 
A. The prosecution of separate
 action, ^  individual 
members of the class would create a risk
 o£ varving adjudications 
with raspect to individual •ember, of th^
 claag ^Ldh would 
establish incompatible standards of cond^ct for the d e f e nd ant 
herein which opposes the class. 
B. The prosecution of separate
 action, ^  individual 
members of the class would create a risk
 o f adjudications with 
respect to individual members of the cla^, ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 M a 
practical matter be dispositive of the i*>tarastg o f &• other 
•amber, not parties to the adjudications,
 o r w u l d SUb«tantially 
impair or impede their ability to protec^
 th8lr interests. 
C. The questions of law and tKet comon ^ ^m members 
cf the class predominate ever any questic,nt affecting only 
individual members* and a class action ia auperior to other 
available methods for the fair and effici,Bt adjudication of the 
controversy. 
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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand that defendants reimburse 
•aeh class member for the monies plus Interest received by 
Crove Finance Company for each such class member. The exact 
•mount of such recovery to be determined after completion of 
class certification and discovery. 
BATED this £ n d - a»v
 of Marc, l m # 
kOBERT J. DEBRY / 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
965',East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 64117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD D. MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife, BOYD A. 
SWENSEN and BEATRICE SWENSEN, 
his wife, BLAINE ANDERSON and 
SHEREE ANDERSON, his wife, 
HOPE A.. HILTON, CYNTHIA 
HILTON, RALPH M. HILTON, GENE 
HELLAND and the MIDDLE EAST 
FOUNDATION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT 
BRIMHALL, and JOHN DOES I to 
V, being former Commissioners 
of the Utah Department of 
Financial Institutions, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW the plaintiffs for themselves and all others 
similarly situated and allege as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs were each depositors in Grove Finance 
Company. 
2. John Does I through V are persons whose identities 
•*e not presently known. However, they are former Commission-
ers of- the Utah Department of financial Institutions. This 
allegation includes each commissioner who has held office from 
COMPLAINT 
fClass Action) 
the incorporation of Grove Finance to the insolvency of Grove 
Finance. As these identities are determined by discovery, 
plaintiffs will amend this complaint and insert the true 
identities. 
3. Grove Finance Company was a Utah corporation trans-
acting a banking business within the State of Utah within the 
meaning of §7-3-1, U.C.A. in that Grove Finance Company held 
itself out to the public as receiving money on deposit within 
the meaning of $7-3-3 U.C.A. 
PLAINTIFFS* CAUSE OF ACTION 
4. John Does i' -through V and the Defendant Mirvin D. 
Borthick and .W. Smoot Brimhall had a duty to inspect and 
supervise the financial integrity of Grove Finance Company 
within the meaning of $7-1-7 U.C.A. In particular, defendants 
had a duty to do the following: 
A. Visit and examine every banking business at 
least once each year within the meaning of 
$7-1-8 U.C.A. 
B. At the time of each annual visit to inquire into 
the condition and resources of the institution 
examined, the mode of conducting and managing 
its affairs/, the official actions of its direc-
tors and officers, the investment and disposi-
tion of its funds, the security offered to 
members and whether or not it was violating any 
provisions of law within the meaning of $7-l~8 
U.C.A. 
2 
Notify the Board of Directors of any banking 
business in vriting if any officer or employee 
of that bank vas found to be dishonest, reckless 
or incompetent or railed to perform any duty of 
his office vithin the meaning of §7-1-13, U.C.A. 
Require the Board of Directors of each banking 
business to examine the affairs of the institu-
tion vith a special purpose of ascertaining the 
value and security thereof vithin the meaning of 
$7-1-14, U.C.A. 
Call for not less than four reports each year 
concerning the condition of each banking busi-
ness and to certify such report for publication 
vithin the meaning of S7-1-17 U.C.A. 
Call for special reports as may be necessary for 
the protection of the public vithin the meaning 
of S7-1-18, U.C.A. 
Inform the county attorney of any violation of 
any provision of lav vhich constitutes a misde-
meanor or felony by any officer, director or 
employee of any banking 'business vithin the 
meaning of $7-1-23 U.C.A. 
Refuse to grant approval for the filing of 
articles of incorporation of any banking busi-
ness when the plan of operation does not comply 
vith the lavs of this state vithin the meaning 
of $7-1-26 U.C.A. 
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I. Take possession of the business and property of 
any banking business which is conducting its 
business in an unauthorized or unsafe manner 
within the meaning of $7-2-1 U.C.A. 
5. Defendants have been grossly negligent in that they 
have wholly failed to discharge any of the duties and 
responsibilities pleaded in 44 above. 
6. Plaintiffs reasonably believed that Defendants had 
discharged the duties and responsibilities pleaded in #4 above. 
7. Plaintiffs relied upon defendants to inspect and 
supervise Grove Finance Company as pleaded in #4 above; and in 
reliance thereon, plaintiffs have «ach deposited or placed 
substantial sums of money with Grove Finance Company. 
8. Grove Finance Company has wholly failed to meet the 
requirements set up by Utah Law, viz., $7-3-1 et seg. U.C.A. 
As a result thereof. Grove Finance Company has become insol-
vent. 
9. Plaintiffs did not discover the defendants' gross 
negligence until on or about July 18, 1980, when Grove Finance 
was forced to close its doors. Plaintiffs could not reasonably 
have learned of the defendants' gross negligence at any earlier 
time because the plaintiffs did not have access to any of the 
defendants' reports or work product. Furthermore, the 
defendants lulled the plaintiffs by giving periodic reports 
that no problems existed with Grove Finance. 
10. By reason of the insolvency of Grove Finance Company, 
the named Plaintiffs have lost their deposits in Grove Finance 
A 
except that the bankruptcy court has or will pay a small 
dividend on the loss. 
PLAINTIFFS1 ALTERNATIVE CAUSE OF ACTION 
H„ If Grove Finance is not transacting a "banking 
business" within the meaning of 57*3-1, Utah Code Ann,, then it 
is a "regulated lender" within the meaning of S70B-3-501 Utah 
Code Ann, 
12. Defendants had a duty to investigate the financial 
responsibility of Grove Finance prior to issuing a license. 
(J70B-3-503 (2) U.C.A.) Defendants failed to make any such 
investigation. 
13. Defendants had a duty to examine periodically at 
intervals the loans, business, and records of Grove Finance. 
Defendants failed to make any such examination (S70B-3-506(1) 
Utah Code Ann.) 
14. Defendants had a duty to revoke the license of Grove 
Finance. (S70B-3-504, Utah Code Ann.) Defendants did not make 
any timely revocation. 
15. Plaintiffs relied upon the defendants to make timely 
investigations, examinations, and revocations. If Defendants 
had made any investigation, examination, or timely revocation 
as alleged above, the Plaintiffs would not have deposited their 
funds in Grove Finance; or, in the alternative, plaintiffs 
brould have withdrawn their funds from Grove Finance. 
16. Grove Finance has become insolvent because of 
improper conduct that would have been uncovered by any timely 
investigation or examination. 
17. By reason of the insolvency of Grove Finance, the 
Plaintiffs have lost their deposits, except that a small 
dividend has been or will be paid on deposits by the bankruptcy 
court. 
18. Defendants have been grossly negligent in that they 
have wholly failed to discharge any of the duties and 
responsibilities pleaded above• 
19. Plaintiffs did not discover the defendants9 gross 
negligence until on or about July 18, 1980, when Grove Finance 
was forced to close its doors• Plaintiffs could not reasonably 
have learned of the defendants9 gross negligence at any earlier 
time because the plaintiffs did not have access to any of the 
defendants1 reports or work product* Furthermore, the 
defendants lulled the plaintiffs by giving periodic reports 
that no problems existed with Grove Finance. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against defendants 
as follows: 
1* For the amount of deposits made to Grove Finance, 
plus accrued Interest, and minus any dividends from the 
bankruptcy court* The exact amount is not presently known. 
However, plaintiffs will seek leave of court to amend the 
6 
complaint when discovery is completed. 
2. For such other and further relief as the court deems 
just and proper. 
DATED this Jlz day of CJk^JL. , 1983. 
ROBERT J^ DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
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APPENDIX C 
STATUTES CITED 
IKC.A. 63-30-4 (prior to 1983): 
Nothing contained in this act, 
unless specifically provided, is to be 
construed as an admission or denial of 
liability or responsibility in so far as 
governmental entities ar concerned. 
Wherein immunity from suit is waived by 
this act, consent to be sued is granted 
and liability of the entity shall be 
determined as if the entity were a 
private person. 
The remedy against a governmental 
entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which 
occurs during the performance of such 
employeefs duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority 
is, after the effective date of this 
act, exclusive of any other civil action 
or proceeding by reason of the same 
subject matter against the employee or 
the estate of the employee whose act or 
omission gave rise to the claim, unless 
the employee acted or failed to act 
through gross negligence, fraud, or 
malice. 
An employee may be joined in an 
action against a governmental entity in 
a representative capacity if the act or 
omission complained of is one for which 
the governmental entity may be liable, 
but no employee shall be held personally 
liable for acts or omissions occurring 
during the performance of the employee1s 
duties, within the scope of employment 
or under color of authority, unless it 
is established that the employee acted 
or failed to act due to gross 
negligence, fraud or malice. 
U.C.A. 63-30-4 (as amended by 1983 Legislature): 
(1) Nothing contained in this 
chapter, unless specifically provided, 
shall be construed as an admission or 
denial of liability or responsibility in 
so far as governmental entities or their 
employees are concerned. If immunity 
from suit is waived by this chapter, 
consent to be sued is granted and 
liability of the entity shall be 
determined as if the entity were a 
private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall 
be construed as adversely affecting any 
immunity from suit which a governmental 
entity or employee may otherwise assert 
under state or federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a 
governmental entity or its employee for 
an injury caused by any act or omission 
which occurs during the performance of 
such employeefs dutiesf within the scope 
of employmentf or under color of 
authorty is, after the effective date of 
this act, exclusive of any other civil 
action or proceeding by reason of the 
same subject matter against the employee 
or the estate of the employee whose act 
or omission gave rise to the claim, 
unless the employee acted or failed to 
act through fraud or malice. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an 
action against a governmental entity in 
a representative capacity if the act or 
omission complained of is one for which 
the governmental entity may be liable, 
but no employee may be held personally 
liable for acts or omissions occurring 
during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment 
or under color of authority, unless it 
is established that the employee acted 
or failed to act due to fraud or malice. 
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U.C.A. 63-30-10 (prior to 1982 amendment): 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of his 
employment except if the injury: 
(1) arises out of the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or 
not the discretion is abused, or 
(2) arises out of assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of 
process, libel, slander, deceit, interference 
with contract rights, infliction of mental 
anguish, or civil rights, or 
(3) arises out of the issuance, denial, 
suspension, or revocation of, or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or 
revoke, any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization, 
or 
(4) arises out of a failure to make an 
inspection, or by reason of making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection of any 
property, or 
(5) arises out of the institution or 
prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without 
probable cause, or 
(6) arises out of a misrepresentation by 
said employee whether or not such is 
negligent or intentional, or 
(7) arises out of or results from riots, 
unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence and civil disturbance, or 
(8) arises out of or in connection with 
the collection of and assessment of taxes, 
or 
(9) arises out of the activities of the 
Utah National Guard, or 
(10) arises out of the incarceration of 
any person in any state prison, county or 
city jail or other place of legal confinment, 
or 
(11) arises from any natural condition on 
state lands or the result of any activity 
authorized by the state land board. 
-3-
U.C.A. 64-30-11 (prior to 1983): 
Any person having a claim for 
injury to person or property against a 
governmental entity or its employee 
shall, before maintaining an action 
under this act, file a written notice of 
claim with such entity for appropriate 
relief including money damages. The 
notice of claim shall set forth a brief 
statement of the facts and the nature of 
the claim asserted, shall be signed by 
the person making the claim or such 
persons1s agent, attorney, parent or 
legal guardian, and shall be directed 
and delivered to the responsible 
governmental entity within the time 
prescribed in section 63-30-12 or 
63-30-13, as applicable. 
Service of the notice of claim upon 
an employee of a governmental entity is 
not a condition precedent to the 
commencement of an action or special 
proceeding against such person. If an 
action or special proceeding is 
commenced against the employee, but not 
against the governmental entity, service 
of the notice of claim upon the 
governmental entity is required only if 
the entity has a statutory duty to 
indemnify such person. 
If the claimant is under the age of 
majority, or mentally incompetent and 
without a legal guardian, or imprisoned 
at the time the cause of action accrued, 
the court, in its discretion, may extend 
the time for service of notice of claim, 
but in no event shall it grant an 
extension which exceeds the general 
statutory period of limitation 
applicable to the cause of action. In 
determining whether to grant an 
extension, the court shall consider 
whether the delay in serving the notice 
of claim will substantially prejudice 
the governmental entity in maintaining 
its defense on the merits. 
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U.C.A. 63-30-11 (as amended by 1983 Legislature): 
(1) A claim is deemed to arise 
when the statute of limitations that 
would apply if the claim were against a 
private person commences to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for 
injury against a governmental entity or 
against an employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the 
performance of his duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall, before maintaining an 
action, file a written notice of claim 
with such entity. 
(3) The notice of claim shall set 
forth a brief statement of the facts, 
the nature of the claim asserted, and 
the damages incurred by the claimant so 
far as they are known, shall be signed 
by the person making the claim or such 
person1s agent, attorney, parent or 
legal guardian, and shall be directed 
and delivered to the responsible 
governmental entity in the manner and 
within the time prescribed in section 
63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as applicable. 
(4) If, at the time the claim 
arises, the claimant is under the age of 
majority, or mentally incompetent and 
without a legal guardian, or imprisoned, 
upon application by the claimant and 
after hearing and notice to the 
governmental entity the court, in its 
discretion, may extend the time for 
service of notice of claim, but in no 
event shall it grant an extension which 
exceeds the applicable statute of 
limitations. In determining whether to 
grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving 
the notice of claim will substantially 
prejudice the governmental entity in 
maintaining its defense on the merits. 
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U.C.A. 63-30-12 (prior to 1983): 
A claim against the state is barred 
unless notice of claim is filed with the 
attorney general and the agency 
concerned within one year after the 
cause of action arises. 
U.C.A. 63-30-12 (as amended by 1983 Legisalture): 
A claim against the state or its 
employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his 
duties, within the scope of employment, 
or under color of authority, is barred 
unless notice of claim is filed with the 
attorney general and the agency 
concerned within one year after the 
claim arises, or before the expiration 
of any extension of time granted under 
subsection 63-30-11(4). 
U.C.A. 63-30-15 (prior to 1983): 
If the claim is denied, a claimant 
may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity in 
those circumstances where immunity from 
suit has been waived as in this act 
provided. Said action must be commenced 
within one year after denial or the 
denial period as specified herein. 
U.C.A. 63-30-15 (as amended by 1983 Legislature): 
If the claim, is denied, a claimant 
may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity in 
those circumstances in which immunity 
from suit has been waived in this 
chapter. The action must be commenced 
within one year after denial or the 
denial period as specified in this 
chapter. 
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U.C.A. 63-30-36 (enacted by 1983 Legislature): 
(1) Before a governmental entity 
may defend its employee against a claimf 
the employee must make a written request 
to the governmental entity to defend him 
and must make it within ten days after 
service of process upon him or within 
such longer period as would not 
prejudice the governmental entity in 
maintaining a defense on his behalf, or 
conflict with notice requirements 
imposed on the entity in connection with 
insurance carried by the entity relating 
to the risk involved. If the employee 
fais to make a request or fails to 
reasonably cooperate in the defense, the 
governmental entity is not required to 
defend or continue to defend the 
employee, nor pay any judgment, 
compromise, or settlement against the 
employee in respect to the claim. 
(2) If a governmental entity 
conducts the defense of an employee, the 
governmental entity shall pay any 
judgment based upon or any compromise or 
settlement of the claim except as 
provided in subsection (3). 
(3) A governmental entity may 
conduct the defense of an employee under 
an agreement with the employee that the 
government entity reserves the right not 
to pay the judgment, compromise, or 
settlement unless it is established that 
the claim rose out of an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his 
duties, within the scope of his 
employment, or under color of authority. 
U.C.A. 63-48-1 (repealed by 1983 Legislature): 
The purpose of this act is to 
protect officers and employees of public 
entities from personal liability arising 
from acts or omissions committed during 
the performance of their duties, within 
the scope of their employment, or under 
color of authority. 
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U.C.A. 63-48-2(3) (repealed by 1983 Legislature): 
As used in this act: 
• • • 
(3) "Claim11 means any alleged 
personal legal liability arising out of 
any act or omission by any officer or 
employee during the performance of his 
duties, within the scope of his 
employment, or under color of authority. 
U.C.A. 63-48-3 (repealed by 1983 Legislature): 
(1) If any officer ro employee 
desires the public entity to defend him 
against any claim, the officer or 
employee shall request the public entity 
in writing to do defend him not later 
than ten days after service of process 
upon him in respect to the claim. If 
the officer or employee fails to make 
such request of the public entity, or if 
the officer or employee fails to 
reasonably co-operate in the defense of 
the claim, then the public entity is not 
obligated to defend the officer or 
employee against the claim or continue 
this defense in case of such failure to 
co-operate, nor pay any judgment, 
compromise, or settlement in respect to 
the claim. 
(2) If the public entity conducts 
the defense of the officer or employee 
against the claim, then the public 
entity shall pay any judgment based upon 
or any compromise or settlement of the 
claim except as provided in subsections 
(3) or (4) of this section. 
(3) In connection with the defense 
of the officer or employee against a 
claim, the public entity may conduct the 
defense under an agreement with that 
officer or employee to the effect that 
the public entity reserves the right not 
to pay the judgment, compromise, or 
settlement until it is established that 
the claim arose out of an act or 
omission occurring during the 
performance of his duties, within the 
scope of his employment, or under color 
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of authority. 
(4) No public entity is obligated 
to pay any judgment based upon a claim 
against an officer or employee if it is 
established that the officer or employee 
acted or failed to act due to gross 
negligence, fraud, or malice. 
(5) Nothing in this section 
authorizes a public entity to pay such 
part of a claim or judgment as is for 
punitive or exemplary damages. 
U.C.A. 63-48-4 (repealed by 1983 Legislature): 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) of 
this section, if an officer or employee 
pays any judgment entered against him, 
or any portion of it, which the public 
entity is required to pay under section 
63-48-3, the officer or employee is 
entitled to recover the amount of such 
payment and the costs of his defense 
from the public entity. 
(2) If the public entity does not 
conduct the defense of an officer or 
employee against a claim or does conduct 
this defense under an agreement as 
provided in subsection 3 of section 
63-48-3, the officer or employee may 
recover from the public entity under 
subsection (1) of this section only if: 
(a) He establishes that the act or 
omission upon which the judgment is 
based occurred during the performance of 
his duties, within the scope of his 
employment, or under color of authority 
and that he conducted the defense of the 
claim against him in good faith; and 
(b) The public entity fails to 
establish that the officer or employee 
acted or failed to act due to gross 
negligence, fraud, or malice. 
-9-
U.C.A. 78-12-26(4): 
Within three years: 
• • • 
(4) An action for a liability 
created by the statutes of this state, 
other than for a penalty or forfeiture 
under the laws of this state, except 
where in speical cases a different 
limitation is prescribed by the statutes 
of this state. 
U.C.A. 78-12-40: 
If any action is commenced within 
due time and a judgment thereon for the 
plaintiff is reversed, or if the 
plaintiff fails in such action or upon a 
cause of action otherwise than upon the 
merits, and the time limited, either by 
law or contract for commencing the same 
shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if 
he dies and the cause of action 
survives, his representatives, may 
commence a new action within one year 
after the reversal or failure. 
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